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pointed out that the federal circuit court of appeals in Jackson v.
Western Union Telegraph Co.," decided in 1921, had stated that
Article 1359 prevented the acquisitionof land by a dissolved corporation for the purpose of winding up its affairs, paying debts,
or distributing assets among its stockholders. The federal case is
distinguishable on its facts, since no option to purchase was involved. Granting that the legislative purpose of Article 1359 was
to limit corporate ownership of lands, the statute should not restrict
trustees of a dissolved corporation from acquiring real estate for
the benefit of its former stockholders.
Richard E. Batson, Jr.

EVIDENCE
LEARNED TREATISES (TEXtS)

Bowles v. Bourdon' was a suit for damages for malpractice.
Judgment was rendered for defendant doctor on an instructed
verdict, plaintiff having failed to show that defendant's negligence,
if any, was the proximate cause of the injury. Plaintiff had read
excerpts from certain medical works in his cross-examination of
defendant, and on appeal urged them as evidence of proximate
cause on the theory that defendant's responses were admissions.
Held: when a doctor testifies as an expert on injuries or diseases,
he may be asked to identify a given work as a standard authority
on the subject involved; if he so recognizes it, excerpts therefrom
may be read not as original evidence, but solely for the purpose of
discrediting his testimony or testing its weight. The answers of the
witness to questions based on the treatise were not admissions
because the context showed that such answers were qualified by
other testimony of the witness.
Alabama is cited by the court as the only jurisdiction which
22 269 Fed. 598 (C.C.A. 5th, 1921).

1-

Tex.-

, 219 S. W. 2d. 779 (1949).
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permits the use of medical treatises to establish the proof of their
own statements. The court cites 32 C.J.S., Evidence, sec. 718, p.
267, as stating the reasons for the general rule to be the unsettled
condition of the sciences and the absence of opportunity to crossexamine. When the rapid advances in scientific knowledge in recent years and the stability of much of that knowledge are considered, it is surprising to hear repeated the argument that medical
science is still so unsettled that treaties are almost immediately
out-dated and are less reliable than the testimony of so-called
expert witnesses present in the courtroom. An expert witness must,
of necessity, be basing the greater part of his information and
knowledge on just such treatises; to contend otherwise would be
to close one's eyes to the truth. It is not felt that any opportunity
must be afforded for cross-examination of such an expert witness
on the sources of his knowledge. There is much to be said in favor
of the Alabama rule. An exception could be made to the hearsay,
rule in order to permit the introduction of standard and authoritative scientific treatises to establish the truth of matters contained
therein.
In stating the general rule concerning the inadmissibility of
such works as proof of their own statements, the court follows the
great weight of authority ;2 however, in permitting the use of such
evidence for impeachment purposes, it falls in line with the minority.3 It would seem, if such evidence is objectionable where it is
sought to be used to establish the truth of matters asserted, it
should be equally objectionable when it is offered to discredit a
witness. Where excerpts from medical treatises are introduced to
lessen the weight of a witness' testimony, it is obvious that these
same excerpts must be given some independent weight toward proving the truth of matters asserted; otherwise they could not be considered for even such a limited purpose. In following the minority
in this regard it is felt that the court has taken a more realistic
2 6 WIGMORE, TR ATISE ON EvN cE

8 6 WIGmopE, op. cit. § 1700.

(3rd ed.) § 1693 (1940).
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approach to the problem than it has in its position that such evidence is inadmissible because hearsay.
The case indicates that even though hearsay, such evidence may
be received if it satisfies the requirements of an admission. Apparently, at the present time, it is only under this exception that such
evidence may be introduced as independent authority for the
facts stated.
EXPERT TESTIMONY, INTERPRETING X-RAYS (TEXAS)

Defendant, in Hall v. State,4 on trial for assault with intent to
murder, objected to testimony of a doctor, witness for the state,
offered in response to a question as to what X-rays he had taken
of the injured party showed. The grounds of the objection were

that the X-rays themselves were the best evidence, that no predicate
had been laid for the introduction of secondary evidence, and that
the evidence offered was hearsay. The doctor was permitted to
describe the injuries without producing the X-rays themselves.
Held: The witness was entitled to state the condition of the injured
party's head and face when he treated him and what he found as
a result of his examination, which the X-rays may or may not have
confirmed. Since there was nothing in the bill showing the jurors
or any other persons connected with the trial were able to read
such pictures, their introduction would have served no useful purpose.
Defendant's objection to the question posed seems sound. The
information sought to be elicited was that revealed by the X-rays,
and the "best evidence" rule was applicable. The trial court admitted the evidence with the comment that the witness might state
the condition of the injured party,5 and this was upheld on the
theory that the doctor might testify relying both on his examination and the pictures. While unquestionably the assistance of an
expert witness should be required to interpret and explain such
evidence, to require a showing that some one other than the doctor
4'-Tex.

Crim. Rep. -,

219 S. W. 2d. 475 (1949).

5 The instruction to the jury is not too clear.
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was capable of reading such pictures in order to insist on their
production is to lay down a rule that has not been advanced before.
With this requirement as a prerequisite, it is doubtful, in the
absence of other expert witnesses, that an adverse party could ever
maintain his right to have such original evidence produced. A
defendant, in a criminal case, is not always able to obtain expert
witnesses, and it is seldom that judges and jurors are skilled in
the interpretation of X-rays.
CONFRONTATION (NEW MEXICO, ARKANSAS)

In State v. Martin et al.' the trial court experienced difficulty
which might have been avoided by the simple expedient of referring to a dictionary. Three defendants were jointly tried and convicted for involuntary manslaughter. At the conclusion of the
State's case in chief defendant Martin rested and moved for a
directed verdict. The motion was overruled. Thereafter, the other
defendants took the stand and gave testimony damaging to Mar.
tin, who was refused permission to cross-examine unless he first
withdrew his motion. Held: The right of confrontation given a
defendant by Article 2, Section 14, New Mexico Constitution,'
had been denied; judgment was reversed as to defendant Martin.
No justification exists for so conditioning defendant's right to
cross-examine an adverse witness. Citing Webster's New International Dictionary the court defined "to rest" as "to bring to an
end voluntarily the introduction of evidence, the right to introduce
fresh evidence, except in rebuttal, being thereupon lost."
The holding is clearly correct: the opportunity for cross-examination is recognized as the essential purpose of confrontation',
and to deny defendant this right unless he first withdraws a legitimate motion is too arbitrary an exercise of judicial discretion to
pass unchecked. Since the burden of going forward with the evi653 N. M. 413, 209 P. 2d. 525 (1949).
7 "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ..
with the witnesses against him."
6 5 WicMons, op. cit. § 1395.

.

to be confronted
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dence lay on the State, defendant could properly rest if he felt
the prosecution had failed to establish its case. The benefits to
the general course of justice in forcing the defendant to withdraw
the motion before he could cross-examine are slight; the injustice
to the defendant in the court's position was great. The case itself
is not important, but it does arouse one's curiosity as to the cause
of this impasse. It appears that both the trial court and defendant's counsel might have been more intent on maintaining and
vindicating their respective positions than they were in displaying
the judicial impartiality and respectful restraint that should be
controlling in such proceedings.
An Arkansas case, Barnes et al. v. State,9 involved the utilization
of a written confession for impeachment purposes, and the right
of confrontation. The confession, purportedly made by defendant's accomplice, was not received in evidence, but the trial court
permitted its use in cross-examination of defendant; parts were
read to defendant, and he was questioned as to the truth or falsity
thereof. This testimony, over objection, went to the jury for the
limited purpose of testing the credibility of the witness. Held, this
was a denial to defendant of his constitutional right of confrontation. Such evidence was hearsay and improperly admitted because
no opportunity was offered for cross-examination.
The two grounds given for exclusion of this evidence appear
sound. The right of cross-examination, as indicated in the New
Mexico case above, is essential to the right of confrontation. Limiting the purpose for which such evidence is admitted does not alter
its nature as hearsay nor eliminate the probability of improper use
by the jury. Though professedly used solely for impeachment, such
a use carries with it a tacit acceptance of the confession as proving
the truth of the matters contained therein; otherwise, it would have
no value even for impeachment purposes. Any extra-judicial utterance which is submitted as evidence of the truth of the facts asserted is hearsay. This ingenious method of getting inadmissible
9

.-

Ark.-,

223 S. W. 2d. 503 (1949).

1950]

SURVEY OF SOUTHWESTERN LAW FOR 1949

297

evidence before the jury, superficially for a limited purpose, was
recognized and disposed of by the court as it should have been.
RES GESTAE (ARKANSAS)
The term "res gestae" seems to have been loosely used in
Thacker v. Hicks,' ° a case of forcible entry and detainer. Here the
rule is stated that extra-judicial declarations of a person in possession of land showing that he held in his own right and not as the
agent of another are admissible, as exceptions to the hearsay rule,
on the principle of res gestae to show that the declarant had the
hostile intent necessary to support a claim of adverse possession.
Indiscriminate use of this phrase has been effectively criticized
elsewhere," but it may not be inapposite to mention again the desirability of accurate thinking on the hearsay rule. The obvious
criticism to be levelled at the holding in the instant case is that
such declarations are not hearsay at all; they are not offered as
evidence of the truth of the facts asserted, but only to indicate the
nature of the possession. For the court to admit evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, such evidence must first be hearsay.
The declarations are not used to establish either the title of the
declarant or the fact of possession, but are circumstantial evidence
of the hostility of declarant's possession. Since the courts appear
to be committed to a continual use of the phrase "res gestae," it
would be preferable if they would confine its application to those
cases where extra-judicial declarations are so spontaneous as to
eliminate any reasonable doubts of their reliability. 2
CONFESSIONS (TExAs)

Housewright v. State" contains a statement by the court which,
if taken as stating the complete rule, would be a highly desirable
reversal of the previous Texas position on acts as confessions. It
, 224 S. W. 2d. 1 (1949).
10
-Ark.1t 6 WIGMORE, op. cit. § 1767.
2
1 McCoRMICK AND RAY, TEXAs LAW OF EvIowcE

cit. § 1745.
Tex. Crim. Rep.-,
13 -

(1937) § 382; 6 WGmoR,

225 S. W. 2d. 417 (1949).

op.
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was held that motion pictures of one being booked on a charge of
driving while intoxicated were admissible, although consent was
not given and no warning was tendered in compliance with the
statute.14 The court distinguishes between acts performed and a
confession made; the former, it is said, are admissible, the latter
are not, unless coming strictly within the letter of the statute. The
pictures are but a clearer delineation of what witnesses at the scene
saw and could have described from memory.
The instant case falls in line with an earlier Texas case, cited by
the court, where it was held that placing an accused's foot within a
footprint was not forcing him to give testimony against himself; 15
8 to the
however, that case was qualified later in Kennison v. State"
effect that such a holding was an exception to the general rule
holding conduct of the accused a confession. The instant case, if
taken literally, would eliminate any necessity for finding such an
exception. Texas stands alone in this interpretation of a confession, 7 although several exceptions have been made to the rule as
stated." A complete and unequivocal abandonment of this strange
Texas holding could be effected and still be within the statute,
there being nothing therein calling for the inclusion of acts within
the definition of a confession. The instant case seems correct in its
result, although, judging from previous cases, the language is too
broad. It would perhaps be over-optimistic to hope that the case
will not be so distinguished by later decisions as to render it completely ineffectual as a precedent for a more orthodox interpretation of a confession. It is true, of course, that Article 727 makes
provision for the admissibility of unwarned confessions made
while under arrest where the statements of facts and circumstances
are found to be true and conduce to establish the guilt of the
accused. On this basis alone the instant case can be limited. The
14 Tex. Code Crim. Pro. (1925)

art. 727.

15 Walker v. State, 7 Tex. Crim. App. 245, 32 Am. Rep. 595 (1879).
1697 Tex. Crim. Rep. 154. 260 S. W. 174 (1924).

17 3 WtGMOsR, op. cit. § 821, note 1.

is

McCoRMICK AND RAY, TExAs LAw or EvwIDNcr (1937)

§ 527.
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fact remains that the unqualified statement by the court is to be
preferred over the present Texas rule.
SELF-INCRIMINATION (TEXAS)

A case involving still another aspect of Article 727, Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure, was Trollinger v. State. 9 Defendant, after
shooting three persons, drove to the county jail, arriving there
some thirty or forty-five minutes after the event, and gave himself
up to the jailer. At the trial the jailer testified, over objection, that
in answer to questioning by him, defendant had made certain
damaging statements. Defendant contended that the statements
were inadmissible because he was under arrest at the time, no
warning had been given, and the statements were oral. Held, reaffirming the Texas rule, it is not necessary that there be a formal
arrest to make compliance with Article 727 mandatory; the test
is whether the accused reasonably believed himself to be in custody. The time between the shooting and the statements was too
great to make them admissible as part of the res gestae, or as spontaneous declarations.
While the case presents no new statements of law concerning
the admissibility of confessions made while under arrest or in custody," it is a reaffirmance of the strict interpretation of Article
727. The Texas rule requiring a formal warning to an accused in
custody is unique, all other American jurisdictions requiring only
that such confessions be voluntary, 2' apparently feeling that no
harm will ensue in the absence of such warning. The Texas rule
has been under attack for many years,22 and no logical argument
can be advanced in its support. Its benefits to an innocent accused
appear non-existent, whereas it obviously serves well the guilty.
If the requirement of a warning under such circumstances were
1920

Tex. Crim. Rep.-,

219 S. W. 2d. 1019 (1949).

McCoRMiCK AND RAY, TExAs LAw or EvIDEN (1937) § 538.
AND RAY, op. cit. § 537.
21 McCoC01I
A Louisiana case recently decided, State v. Byrd. 38 So. 2d. 395 (La. 1949),
represents the majority in holding it is not necessary to warn an accused in custody.
23

Comment, 4 TeL L Rev. 499 (1926).

